Embedded Files
Politics and Business
Politics and Business
My research is mainly at the intersection of political factors and companies, whether established public firms or fresh innovative startups. Specifically, I try to understand how politics influence company perception, behavior, and performance. For example, some of my research tries to understand how firms strategically respond to changes in government regulatory landscape. As another example, other research tries to understand how various stakeholders react when there is political misalignment between the stakeholder and the firm. The goal of my research is to add to both theory and practice in today's politically charged world. Below are several projects that have been recently accepted for publication. I will likewise soon update this section.Â
Abstract
Abstract
Government agencies rely on general deterrence to protect the public. Firms utilize lobbying for influence and information purposes. This paper explores the intersection of general deterrence and lobbying by firms while investigating whether general deterrence efforts of regulators are met with a lobbying response. Specifically, we propose that following a competitor firm being sanctioned, the non-sanctioned peer firms will increase their amount of lobbying targeted at the sanctioning agency, and the key drivers of these increases in targeted lobbying will be penalty severity, concerns over likely reputational damage, and value alignment. We test our hypotheses using U.S. Environmental Protection Agency violations as a context, and they largely receive support.
Kolomeitsev, S., Moergen, K., Ridge, J., Worrell, D., & Kuban, S. (Forthcoming). Peer Response to Regulatory Enforcement: Lobbying by Non-Sanctioned Firms. Journal of Management. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/01492063231226250
Abstract
Abstract
We develop and test theory regarding the effect of CEO paranoia, defined as stable tendencies toward suspicion, feelings of ill will or resentment, mistrust, and belief in external control or influence, on firm stakeholder engagement. We theorize that because CEOs higher in paranoia have tendencies toward hypervigilance and the biases of self-as-target and sinister attributions they typically avoid engagement with external stakeholders. Further, we argue that CEOs higher in paranoia are subject to paranoid activation when confronted with trait-relevant cues that confirm suspicions of being targeted by a malevolent external entity (here, regulatory rulings or rival attacks), thus eliciting a shift away from avoidance to a more aggressive engagement with those stakeholders. To do so, we develop a content-analytic measure of CEO paranoia following both theory and evidence in psychology and methodological best practices, finding evidence that broadly supports our premise. In total, our study draws attention to how the manifestation of CEO paranoia changes the way CEOs engage stakeholders over time, contributing to understanding in multiple ways.
Ridge, J., Hill, A., Ingram, A., Kolomeitsev, S., & Worrell, D. (Forthcoming). Avoidance and Aggression in Stakeholder Engagement: The Impact of CEO Paranoia and Paranoia-Relevant Cues. Academy of Management Journal. https://journals.aom.org/doi/abs/10.5465/amj.2021.1432
Page updated
Google Sites
Report abuse